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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ana1 met her abuser when she was only nineteen years old. Doting and 
attentive in the first few months, his attention soon became overwhelming. He 
was angry and jealous whenever Ana spent time with her friends and raged 
when she danced with male cousins at family get-togethers. A year into the 
relationship, Ana became pregnant and the physical violence began. Unable to 
tolerate any deviation from the way he expected “his woman” to behave, he 
lashed out brutally at any misstep. The pushes and shoves whenever she 
“disappointed” him escalated to regular beatings, kicks, lashes, and strangling. 
His machete was always at his side, even in the middle of the night, and he 
threatened that Ana would feel the weight of its blade if she ever disobeyed or 
left him.  
One night, after claiming that the rice Ana made him for dinner was 
flavorless, he rubbed spices in her face and eyes and slammed her head against 
the kitchen counter. Desperate to free herself from his hold, she grasped for a 
nearby pan; the force of the metal against his shoulder startled him and gave 
Ana a few critical moments to lock herself in her room for safety. The next 
morning, he tousled her hair and said he hoped to see such fire in the bedroom 
soon.  
Ana was ashamed of the gashes and bruises that covered her arms and 
legs, so she spent much of her life inside the small home she shared with her 
abuser. The hours cleaning and playing with her baby were relatively peaceful, 
as her husband was often out drinking with his military buddies, many of 
whom now worked odd hours at the local police station. She knew that things 
would be at their worst when he came home smelling of whiskey, so as the 
years passed, Ana learned his patterns and deliberately instigated his attacks. 
She would stand up to him or antagonize him (including through physical 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Ana is a fictional character, but her story is an amalgamation of client stories I have 
been entrusted with the opportunity to hear in my time as a lawyer representing immigrant 
survivors of domestic violence both in my work as a clinical teacher and as an attorney at 
the nonprofit Tahirih Justice Center.  
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violence of her own) when he was sober, or when their child was less likely to 
be at home to witness her father’s violence. Ana also began to hide objects 
strategically around the house—nail files, bookends, canes—so that she could 
use them to fend off the most extreme abuse. She usually hit only hard enough 
to stun, but one night she was so angry that she knocked him unconscious with 
a potted plant. 
Ana sank into a deep depression but did not want to bother her mother, 
who had faced similar violence at the hands of her own husband, with her 
problems. Her sisters, busy with their families, advised her to do more to keep 
her man happy. Ana was alone and penniless (because she had never been 
permitted to work), a fact her husband often reminded her of. “Who else 
would love you?” he mocked. He dared her to leave him, assuring her that if 
she did, she would do so alone, as he would never allow their child to be raised 
without his influence. Seeing no other option, Ana decided to stay.  
Then, one day, her husband disappeared. He came back a week later 
smelling of alcohol and perfume and told her that he no longer wanted to see 
her “fat and disgusting” face—he had booked her a ticket to the United States 
where she would stay with his brother’s family. Ana seized the opportunity for 
freedom and safety; she made the difficult but strategic calculation that her 
daughter would be safer with her mother until Ana was settled in the United 
States, and boarded the plane.  
In the United States, she felt free and safe for the first time in her life. As 
she began making plans to remain permanently, a letter from her husband 
arrived. He demanded that she return to him immediately and told her that if 
she was not home within the month, he would dispatch his cousin, a known 
gang member, who would give her a “permanent home” in a grave in the 
United States. 
Ana’s story is undoubtedly a tragic one, but would the persecution she 
endured make her eligible for asylum protection in the United States? If her 
story is told in its current form, the answer is no. Unless the aspects of Ana’s 
narrative that show her to be a strong, rational, and powerful actor are omitted, 
she would likely fail in her attempts to obtain refuge and achieve safety in this 
country.  
Although likely not contemplated as a basis for protection by the drafters 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention,2 which included the refugee definition that 
was later codified in U.S. law,3 domestic violence has become an accepted 
ground for seeking asylum in the United States. However, the road has been 
neither clear nor easy. The seminal case of Matter of R-A- was the source of 
                                                                                                                     
 2 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, opened for signature July 
28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6623, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) (including 
only those with a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, [or] membership of a particular social group or political opinion” within its 
definition of “refugee”). 
 3 Id.; see also Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42) (2012). 
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over a decade of litigation on the issue of whether domestic violence could be 
a basis for asylum.4 The case was ultimately resolved in a nonbinding opinion 
in 2009,5 and this lack of direction from the courts led to continued confusion 
and inconsistent outcomes for applicants for years.6  
Eventually, a second case involving a battered woman seeking asylum in 
the United States worked its way through the court system: Matter of L-R-.7 
After another lengthy appeals process, it too was ultimately resolved at the 
trial level, and therefore without precedential value.8 The lasting impact of 
Matter of L-R-, oddly enough, was not the final court decision but a lengthy 
and detailed brief from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
agency tasked with advancing the interests of the U.S. government in 
immigration proceedings, which articulated two frameworks for domestic 
violence asylum claims.9 DHS proposed that survivors of domestic violence 
who fit into two groups—“women in domestic relationships who are unable to 
leave” and “women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions 
within a domestic relationship”—could be considered eligible for asylum 
protection in the United States.10 These two groups are now broadly accepted 
as the prevailing mechanism for advancing a winning domestic violence 
asylum claim and are widely utilized by advocates across the country.  
Most recently, on August 26, 2014, a precedential decision on the issue of 
domestic violence as a basis for asylum was finally issued by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest administrative body to interpret U.S. 
immigration laws.11 In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the Board found that “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” constitutes a 
cognizable particular social group that can be the basis of an asylum claim.12 
It is certainly a significant advancement to have a published, precedent-
setting case acknowledging the validity of asylum claims based on domestic 
violence, because for years, DHS’s brief in Matter of L-R- had existed as de 
facto law, and survivors of intimate partner abuse lacked certainty when 
                                                                                                                     
 4 See infra Part III.C. 
 5 In re Alvarado-Pena, [redacted] (Exec. Office for Immigration Review Dec. 10, 
2009) (on file with author). 
 6 See Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 
Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 
109 (2013). 
 7 See Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., http://cgrs.uchastings.edu 
/our-work/matter-l-r [https://perma.cc/G534-7ZDJ]. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Department of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief at 11, In re L-R-, 
[redacted] (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter DHS 2009 Brief], http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ 
sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8PV-A6FG]. 
 10 Id. at 14. 
 11 See In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 12 Id. at 388–89. 
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advancing asylum claims. However, the social groups13 utilized to advance 
such claims are deeply problematic, as only certain types of survivors of 
domestic violence, namely stereotypically weak and powerless victims, are 
currently afforded protection under the existing law.14 And while the legal 
dimensions of asylum for women15 who have experienced and/or fear future 
domestic violence has been widely explored in the academic literature, the 
specific contours of the prevailing particular social groups used today—those 
articulated by DHS in Matter of L-R-16 and accepted by the BIA in Matter of 
A-R-C-G-17—has not been the subject of scholarly analysis. Scholars and 
others have analyzed the significance of the public/private distinction and the 
nonstate actor in such claims18 and the relevance of the lack of government 
                                                                                                                     
 13 This Article will discuss and analyze both particular social groups proposed by the 
DHS in Matter of L-R-—“women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” and 
“women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic 
relationship”—because Matter of A-R-C-G- was relatively recently decided by the BIA. 
See DHS 2009 Brief, supra note 9, at 14. Thus, although only the former group was 
articulated in the new case, see A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388–89, it remains to be seen 
whether the “viewed as property” formulation will diminish in importance. 
 14 Stacy Brustin, Images of Women in U.S. Immigration Policy—The Paradox of 
Domestic Violence, 88 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 454, 457 (1994). 
 15 Although both men and women experience domestic violence, women are impacted 
at a significantly higher rate—one in four women have been the victim of severe physical 
violence by a partner as opposed to one in seven men. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, NATIONAL DATA ON INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, SEXUAL VIOLENCE, AND 
STALKING (2014), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs-fact-sheet-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D5GY-FABC]. In fact, between 1994 and 2010, four in five victims of 
domestic violence were female. Statistics, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, 
http://www.thehotline.org/resources/statistics/ [https://perma.cc/RSZ4-LWJ5]. Other 
sources indicate that 85% of victims of domestic violence are women. CRYSTAL WICK, 
NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, FAQ ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1 (Jan. 
2004), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/DV_FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RMP-8BA9]. 
Women who suffer domestic violence are also subjected to more serious harms than male 
victims. See OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2012 
BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GRANT PROGRAMS UNDER THE 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 5 (2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/l 
egacy/2014/03/13/2012-biennial-report-to-congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NTS-MPSB] 
(“Although both men and women use violence in intimate partnerships, the most severe 
violence (i.e., involving broken bones, injury to bodily organs, sexual assault or coercion, 
and strangulation) is overwhelmingly inflicted by men against their women partners.” 
(citation omitted)). Accordingly, this Article will use the feminine pronoun when referring 
to victims of domestic violence.  
 16 DHS 2009 Brief, supra note 9, at 14. 
 17 A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388. 
 18 E.g., Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Batterers as Agents of the State: Challenging the 
Public/Private Distinction in Intimate Partner Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 35 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 117 (2012); Nina Rabin, At the Border Between Public and Private: U.S. 
Immigration Policy for Victims of Domestic Violence, 7 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 109 
(2013). 
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protection for survivors of family violence.19 Articles have also studied the use 
of the Convention Against Torture to aid women who are deemed ineligible 
for asylum20 and the effect the United States’ and Canada’s Safe-Third-
Country Agreement has had on domestic violence asylum claims.21 It has even 
been argued that a new, gender-neutral social group should be added to U.S. 
asylum criteria in order to better analyze domestic violence-based asylum 
claims.22 
This Article takes a new and different approach, analyzing and critiquing 
the social groups proposed in Matter of L-R- and codified by the BIA in 
Matter of A-R-C-G-, and ultimately arguing that they further a historical 
essentialization of battered women as helpless, passive, and powerless, which 
in turn perpetuates the victimization of domestic violence survivors. Unlike a 
“traditional” asylum claim based (to use a conventional example) on political 
opinion, where the applicant must demonstrate that she has affirmatively acted 
against authority, in the domestic violence context, the onus on the applicant is 
to show that she has not acted, that she has remained submissive and impotent 
in the face of harm and danger. The different standard for this gender-based 
claim results in an immigration policy that “fosters the notion of women as 
deserving of status [only] when they are perceived of as weak, passive victims. 
There is no public recognition of the strength of immigrant women nor of the 
significant contributions that they make on a daily basis to our society.”23 
Thus, as this Article will demonstrate, while the particular social group 
formulations in Matter of L-R- and Matter of A-R-C-G- may ultimately lead to 
protections for certain women, many others—in particular, those who do not 
fit the established profile of a tragic and helpless victim—are excluded. If Ana 
were to succeed in her hypothetical asylum claim, she would need to shed any 
portion of her narrative that involved her instigating or fighting back against 
her abuser; making a rational choice to remain with him due to familial, 
economic, or societal pressures; or terminating her relationship in a manner 
other than fleeing under cloak of darkness. Unless she were able to fit her 
square life into the round hole created by Matter of L-R- and Matter of A-R-C-
G-, Ana would risk being denied much needed protection in the United States. 
And even if Ana were permitted to remain in the safety of the United States, 
                                                                                                                     
 19 E.g., Elsa M. Bullard, Note, Insufficient Government Protection: The Inescapable 
Element in Domestic Violence Asylum Cases, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1867, 1867 (2011). 
 20 E.g., Lori A. Nessel, “Willful Blindness” to Gender-Based Violence Abroad: 
United States’ Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 72–74 (2004). 
 21 Lynn S. Hodgens, Note, Domestic Silence: How the U.S.–Canada-Safe-Third-
Country Agreement Brings New Urgency to the Need for Gender-Based-Asylum 
Regulations, 30 VT. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (2006). 
 22 Lynn Bayes-Weiner, Note, “Family Broils” and Private Terror: A Gender-Neutral, 
Psychologically-Based Approach to Domestic Violence and Asylum Law, 79 UMKC L. 
REV. 1047, 1048 (2011). 
 23 Brustin, supra note 14, at 457. 
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she may ultimately still be fundamentally harmed, as the Matter of L-R- and 
Matter of A-R-C-G- particular social groups disempower women by denying 
them the ability to claim a narrative of strength and agency. 
Part II of this Article provides an introduction to the theory of Battered 
Woman Syndrome and the related principle of “learned helplessness” that 
provide the foundation for the pervasive image of the “vulnerable, 
ashamed . . . dependent, unassertive, depressed, [and] defenseless” domestic 
violence victim.24 Part III then explains how the essentialized view of the 
battered woman has been applied in asylum law. A brief overview and history 
of domestic violence asylum in the United States is provided, including a 
review of the foundational Matter of R-A- case and an analysis of the 
particular social groups for survivors of domestic violence articulated in 
Matter of L-R-: “women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” 
and “women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a 
domestic relationship.”25 It concludes by examining the most recent case in 
this area, Matter of A-R-C-G-, the first published BIA decision granting 
asylum to a survivor of domestic violence. 
Part IV details why these particular social group formulations, premised 
on the stereotype of the helpless, docile, and passive battered woman, are 
problematic. Concerns are identified in four discrete areas: (1) the detrimental 
consequences of a woman’s failure to conform to the prevailing victim 
narrative; (2) the contribution to victim blaming; (3) the lack of recognition 
and understanding of separation violence; and (4) the reliance on the binary 
narratives of either “good” or “bad,” and “worthy” or “unworthy” immigrants. 
Lastly, proposed solutions and alternatives are explored in Part V, including 
the issuance of final regulations that would establish nonessentializing 
particular social groups for battered women. This Part also proposes and 
analyzes several alternative particular social group formulations that would 
enable survivors of domestic violence and their advocates to present 
counternarratives of women demonstrating strength, agency, and resilience in 
the face of abuse.  
II. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AND LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 
A. The Battered Woman 
In 1979, psychologist Lenore Walker published The Battered Woman, a 
groundbreaking book that would come to redefine the public and experts’ view 
of victims of domestic violence.26 Walker, a self-identified feminist who was 
dissatisfied with existing explanations for why women remained in abusive 
                                                                                                                     
 24 Lisa A. Harrison & Cynthia Willis Esqueda, Myths and Stereotypes of Actors 
Involved in Domestic Violence: Implications for Domestic Violence Culpability 
Attributions, 4 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 129, 130 (1999). 
 25 DHS 2009 Brief, supra note 9, at 14. 
 26 LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979). 
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relationships, looked to psychology to explain patterns of behavior that caused 
women to stay.27 Her conclusion was that women remain in situations in 
which they experience domestic violence because of the phenomenon of 
“learned helplessness,” a theory that victims are rendered helpless and 
dependent by the violence they suffer.28  
To corroborate her thesis, Walker relied on interviews she conducted with 
120 women (and “fragments of over 300 more stories”29), as well as studies 
conducted by psychologist Martin Seligman.30 In Seligman’s experiments, 
dogs were placed “in cages and administered electrical shocks at random and 
varied intervals.”31 Unable to control the shocks, the dogs eventually stopped 
trying to escape and “became compliant, passive, and submissive.”32 And 
later, when the cage doors were opened and “the dogs were shown the way 
out, they remained passive, refused to leave, and did not avoid the shock.”33 
Based on this experiment and her interviews, Walker determined that “if 
an organism experiences situations which cannot be controlled, then the 
motivation to try to respond to such events when they are repeated will be 
impaired.”34 Essentially, she concluded that if you don’t believe you have 
control over a negative occurrence, you stop trying to correct or prevent it.35 
Analogizing to victims of domestic violence, she found that “[o]nce the 
women are operating from a belief of helplessness, the perception becomes 
reality and they become passive, submissive, ‘helpless.’”36 
                                                                                                                     
 27 Id. at x–xi. Walker also acknowledged the role that a culture of patriarchy played in 
perpetuating domestic violence, as well as political and societal forces that subjugated 
women, including economic, legal and social dependence on men; the lack of safe housing 
alternatives; inadequate protection from police, courts, hospitals, and social service 
agencies; and pressures to keep families together. Id. at 43. 
 28 Id. at 55. In addition to her observations about learned helplessness, Walker also 
introduced the “cycle theory of violence” that is now routinely used by professionals 
working with survivors of domestic violence to illustrate and explain the dynamics of an 
abusive relationship. Id. The cycle of violence includes “the tension-building phase; the 
explosion or acute battering incident; and the calm, loving respite.” Id. 
 29 Id. at xiii. 
 30 Id. at 45. 
 31 Id. at 46. 
 32 WALKER, supra note 26, at 46.  
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 45. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 47. Walker also compared survivors of domestic violence to victims of major 
traumatic disasters. Id. at 49. She argued that unlike one-time events—such as hurricanes, 
earthquakes, and plane crashes—after which feelings of powerlessness fade, domestic 
violence was more akin to the experiences of those that that survived long-term or repeated 
traumas, such as Nazi concentration camps, that cause people to “become immune, passive, 
and convinced that they cannot do anything to help themselves.” Id. 
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B. Critiques 
Walker’s model for understanding domestic violence revolutionized 
thinking about the issue and became the predominant theory for understanding 
intimate partner violence in the 1980s and 1990s. Although popular and 
initially widely accepted, critiques of Battered Woman Syndrome soon 
emerged. First, Walker’s data and methodology were called into question.37 
The validity of her claims was also cast into doubt—most importantly here, 
the notion that all women who are in abusive relationships are uniformly 
helpless, meek, and passive.38 In fact, researchers have since shown that many 
women who are subjected to violence by their partners “are not the passive 
victims that notions of learned helplessness would imply,” but that they 
instead “assertively and persistently attempt to do something about their 
abuse” but find that the available resources are not sufficient “to stop the cycle 
of violence.”39 
Despite these concerns, Battered Woman Syndrome was incorporated into 
the U.S. legal system in numerous ways. It serves as the basis for the “Battered 
Woman’s Defense,” a self-defense theory that is utilized in attempts to 
exculpate survivors of domestic violence who harm or kill their abusers.40 
Like the foundation upon which it is based, Battered Woman’s Defense has 
also been subjected to much scientific and legal critique.41  
                                                                                                                     
 37 See, e.g., EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS 
SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 3 (1988) (stating that 
the theory of learned helplessness and notion that “battered women are basically passive 
and submissive in response to abuse” “appears to be rooted in assumptions and 
observations rather than hard fact”). See generally Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered 
Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and 
Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45 (examining the empirical basis for the battered woman 
syndrome); David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A 
Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619 (1986) (discussing analytical and 
methodological criticisms). 
 38 As Judith Herman explained in her influential book, Trauma and Recovery, “post-
traumatic symptoms are . . . wide-ranging.” JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND 
RECOVERY 49 (1992); see also Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to 
Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1191, 1196 (1993) (“The psychological realities of battered women do not fit a singular 
profile . . . .”). 
 39 GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 37, at 91–93. 
 40 “To some degree, most jurisdictions accept battered spouse syndrome evidence to 
support a claim of self-defense.” 23A C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused 
§ 1505, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2016) (footnote omitted). 
 41 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making 
Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 211–12 (2002) 
(proposing an alternative approach that would treat battered women as rational actors and 
ask whether their use of defensive force was necessary); David L. Faigman & Amy J. 
Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 69 
(1997) (“The battered woman syndrome ultimately fails because it was never a matter of 
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Lenore Walker’s depiction of battered women as submissive, powerless, 
and unable to advocate for themselves also contributed to an increasingly 
aggressive criminal justice response to domestic violence. When signing the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),42 a law that includes billions of 
dollars in funding for a broad array of measures designed to reduce the 
frequency of violence against women, President Bill Clinton cemented the 
connection between intimate partner violence and crime control when he 
stated that domestic violence is “the most important criminal justice issue in 
the United States.”43  
Criminal interventions, some stemming from VAWA,44 include 
mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies. Mandatory arrest laws 
compel police officers responding to domestic violence calls to make an arrest 
wherever there is probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence 
has been committed, whether or not the victim seeks to have the batterer 
detained.45 No-drop prosecution requires prosecutors to proceed with criminal 
charges against alleged perpetrators of domestic violence, regardless of the 
victim’s wishes.46 Both policies assume that the criminal justice system is 
better suited to make decisions about battered women’s lives than the 
(presumed weak and powerless) women themselves. They have been widely 
criticized as a means for the legal system to disempower and remove agency 
and autonomy from survivors of domestic violence by supplanting the abuser’s 
control with state control.47 Significantly here, scholars have also argued that 
                                                                                                                     
science to begin with, and yet it was treated as a ‘scientific fact’ by courts.”); Cathryn Jo 
Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered 
Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 18 (1986) (advocating for the creation of a new 
defense—excused self-defense—that would “accommodate many battered women’s cases 
excluded by the justification theory without sacrificing the basic goals of the criminal 
law”); Faigman, supra note 37, at 622 (questioning the validity of Walker’s research and 
arguing that courts should not admit expert testimony based on Battered Woman 
Syndrome). But see Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the 
Critics of Battered Women’s Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155 (2004) 
(responding to the criticisms of the Battered Woman’s Defense). 
 42 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).  
 43 EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL 
LIFE 21 (2007) (quoting President Bill Clinton). 
 44 A significant percentage of VAWA funds are distributed to law enforcement 
agencies. In order to be eligible for certain federal funding, VAWA states must certify the 
adoption of policies that either encourage or mandate arrest of domestic violence offenders. 
42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1) (2012). 
 45 See Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of 
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 
(2009). 
 46 Id. at 4. 
 47 See, e.g., id. (noting that mandatory arrest and no-drop policies “gave protection to 
women who had been abused with one hand, but took their freedom to choose with the 
other”); Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case 
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mandatory interventions, like Walker’s Battered Woman Syndrome, 
erroneously “treat battered women as fragile, uncooperative, mentally ill, 
and/or indecisive.”48  
Finally, as will be shown below in Part III, despite having been subjected 
to significant critique over the course of several decades, Battered Woman 
Syndrome and “learned helplessness” have also manifested in the immigration 
context; the prevailing particular social group formulations for domestic 
violence victims seeking asylum protection in the United States require 
women to demonstrate that they are the “property” of their abusers and are 
weak, passive, nonactors who are “unable to leave” their relationships.49 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ASYLUM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. Asylum and the Law of Particular Social Group 
To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must meet the definition of a 
refugee set forth in section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA):  
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . who is 
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.50 
This refugee definition is deceptively brief, as nearly each individual term 
within it has been the subject of significant litigation and academic 
discussion.51 Most relevant here is the penultimate phrase, “membership in a 
                                                                                                                     
but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 211–25 (2008) 
(critiquing mandatory arrest and no-drop policies as suppressing of victims’ voices); 
Dennis P. Saccuzzo, How Should the Police Respond to Domestic Violence: A Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandatory Arrest, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 765 (1999) 
(proposing therapeutic jurisprudence and batterer re-education and healing as an alternative 
to mandatory prosecution). But see Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim 
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1909–10 
(1996) (concluding that prosecutors, not victims, must make the final choice of whether or 
not to prosecute if law enforcement’s goal is to send a message that domestic violence is 
unacceptable). 
 48 Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State 
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 584 (1999). 
 49 DHS 2009 Brief, supra note 9, at 14. 
 50 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) 
(2012). 
 51 See, e.g., Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1238–39, 
1238 nn.4 & 5 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing cases and other sources “stuggl[ing] to define 
‘particular social group’”).  
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particular social group,” which is one of the five grounds upon which an 
applicant can base her claim for protection.52 “Particular social group” is the 
most nuanced and complex of the grounds, and throughout the last several 
decades, courts have struggled with its interpretation.53  
The seminal decision interpreting the phrase is Matter of Acosta, which 
defines “particular social group” as comprising individuals who “share a 
common, immutable characteristic” that either cannot be changed or is so 
fundamental to the individuals’ identities or consciences that they should not 
be required to change it.54 This shared characteristic might be an innate one 
such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a 
shared past experience such as former military leadership or land ownership.55  
Twenty years after Matter of Acosta, the BIA created two additional 
requirements: that any proposed particular social group possess “social 
visibility”56 and be sufficiently “particular.”57 Taking each in turn, in Matter 
of C-A-, the BIA explained that socially visible groups had “characteristics that 
were highly visible and recognizable by others in the country in question.”58 
The court found that the particular social group of “former noncriminal drug 
informants working against the Cali drug cartel”59 in Columbia was not 
visible, and therefore not viable, because “the very nature of the conduct at 
issue is such that it is generally out of the public view. In the normal course of 
events, an informant against the Cali cartel intends to remain unknown and 
undiscovered.”60 
                                                                                                                     
 52 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a). 
 53 The difficulty in defining the term “particular social group” has been unusually 
challenging due to the ambiguity of the phrase itself and the lack of legislative history 
surrounding its inclusion in the refugee definition. As then-Judge Samuel Alito stated:  
 Both courts and commentators have struggled to define “particular social group.” 
Read in its broadest literal sense, the phrase is almost completely open-ended. 
Virtually any set including more than one person could be described as a “particular 
social group.” Thus, the statutory language standing alone is not very instructive.  
 Nor is there any clear evidence of legislative intent. 
Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1238–39 (footnotes omitted); see also Lwin v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 144 F.3d 505, 510–11 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The legislative history behind 
the term . . . is uninformative, and judicial and agency interpretations are vague and 
sometimes divergent. As a result, courts have applied the term reluctantly and 
inconsistently.”). 
 54 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part on other 
grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
 55 Id. at 233. 
 56 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 859–61 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 57 In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007); see also In re S-E-G-, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 58 C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960. 
 59 Id. at 951, 957. 
 60 Id. at 960. 
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Facing significant criticism of this analysis, in 2014 the BIA issued two 
decisions that clarified the social visibility requirement. In Matter of M-E-V-
G- and Matter of W-G-R-, the court asserted that Matter of C-A- had 
improperly been understood as a requiring “‘ocular’ visibility” and that what 
was in fact required was that the defined group possess “social distinction,”61 
or “evidence showing that society in general perceives, considers, or 
recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group.”62 
In addition to possessing social visibility or distinction, a particular social 
group must also be sufficiently “particular.” In Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA 
stated that the determining question when considering particularity is “whether 
the proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently 
distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as a 
discrete class of persons.”63 Particularity, therefore, as the court explained in 
Matter of W-G-R-, “addresses the question of delineation.”64 Lastly, a viable 
particular social group also cannot be circular, meaning that it cannot be 
defined by the harm which the applicant claims as persecution.65  
Although the criteria for what constitutes a viable particular social group 
have evolved over the last twenty years, at the time of publication of this 
Article, immutability, social distinction, particularity, and noncircularity are 
the four key requirements. And these factors are of great consequence in 
modern asylum claims,66 such as those based on domestic violence, sexual 
orientation, disability, or gang violence, which often rely on the particular 
social group ground. 
Lastly, in addition to understanding particular social group, one additional 
area of asylum jurisprudence is important to explore here. An applicant for 
asylum must demonstrate not only that the persecution she fears is based on 
one of the five grounds delineated in the refugee definition, but also that the 
government of her home country is either the persecutory actor or “unable or 
                                                                                                                     
 61 In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (B.I.A. 2014);  In re W-G-R-, 26 
I. & N. Dec. 208, 216 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 62 W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 217. 
 63 In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008); see also In re A-M-E & J-G-
U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 64 W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214. 
 65 See, e.g., Gomez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 947 F.2d 660, 663–64 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (rejecting the particular social group of “women who have been previously 
battered and raped by Salvadoran guerrillas”). 
 66 The definition of a refugee in the 1951 Refugee Convention, upon which the U.S. 
refugee definition is based, was created with certain “archetypal refugees” in mind, 
“namely, the victims of political and religious persecution in Germany . . . and [of] the 
Spanish Republicans.” Barry Sautman, The Meaning of “Well-Founded Fear of 
Persecution” in United States Asylum Law and in International Law, 9 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 483, 533–34 (1986). Thus, the drafters did not seem to have contemplated claims that 
are more common today, such as those alleging persecution based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity, disability, affiliation (or refusal to affiliate) with gangs, or gender 
(including female genital mutilation, forced marriage, and domestic violence). 
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unwilling” to protect her from the persecution of a non-governmental actor.67 
Cases involving so-called nonstate actors introduce an additional level of 
complexity to the asylum analysis, as establishing official unwillingness to 
control a persecutor, or government inaction, is often significantly more 
analytically and evidentiarily challenging than proving government action.68 
B. Matter of Kasinga 
In 1994, Fauziya Kassindja69 arrived in the United States, seeking 
protection from a forced polygamous marriage and female genital mutilation 
(FGM) in her home country of Togo.70 Detained upon arrival, she filed for 
asylum, and her claim was denied by the immigration judge.71 Upon review, 
however, the BIA granted Ms. Kassindja asylum based on her membership in 
the particular social group of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe 
who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the 
practice.”72 The victory in Matter of Kasinga was groundbreaking, as it 
created precedent of gender-related harm constituting a basis for asylum 
protection in the United States. 
C. Matter of R-A- 
With the door to gender-based asylum opened by Matter of Kasinga, a 
case involving a different gender-related harm, domestic violence, soon 
worked its way through the courts: Matter of R-A-.73 Ms. R-A-, whose full 
name is Rodi Alvarado, married her husband, a soldier in the Guatemalan 
army, when she was only sixteen years old.74 From the beginning of her 
marriage until she escaped to the United States a decade later, Ms. Alvarado 
                                                                                                                     
 67 See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (construing persecution as 
requiring that the claimed harm must be inflicted by the government of a country or by 
persons that the government is unable or unwilling to control), overruled in part on other 
grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
 68 See, e.g., Michael G. Heyman, Asylum, Social Group Membership and the Non-
State Actor: The Challenge of Domestic Violence, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 767, 787–89 
(2003); Mikhail Izrailev, Note, A New Normative Approach for the Grant of Asylum in 
Cases of Non-State Actor Persecution, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 171, 173 (2011). 
 69 Ms. Kassindja’s name was improperly transliterated as “Kasinga” in the process of 
her immigration proceedings, and as such, the official name of her case is recorded under 
this misspelled last name. 
 70 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 71 Id. at 357–59. 
 72 Id. at 365. 
 73 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (Att’y 
Gen. 2001), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (Att’y Gen. 2005), stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
629 (Att’y Gen. 2008). 
 74 Id. at 908. 
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faced horrifying and gruesome acts of violence at the hands of her spouse.75 
He raped her almost daily, beating her before and during his violent sexual 
assaults.76 He whipped her with an electrical cord and his military weapon.77 
He used her head to break windows and mirrors and dislocated her jaw.78 
When she became pregnant, he kicked her in her spine in an attempt to force 
an abortion.79 He threatened to maim and disfigure her if she ever left him.80  
In the face of this increasing and near deadly violence, Ms. Alvarado fled 
to the United States and sought asylum.81 Originally granted asylum by the 
immigration judge, the BIA denied her claim82 after the then-Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS)83 appealed.84 The BIA concluded that Ms. 
                                                                                                                     
 75 Id. at 908–09. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 908–09. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 907, 911. 
 83 In 2003, the INS was dismantled and its functions were assumed by the newly-
created DHS (that houses the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE)) and the Department of Justice (the agency that oversees the Immigration Court 
system). Our History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/about-
us/our-history [https://perma.cc/7MJ4-8Y8L] (last updated May 25, 2011). 
 84 Although a complete discussion is outside the scope of this Article, one possible 
explanation for the BIA’s disparate treatment of Ms. Kassindja and Ms. Alvarado’s claims 
is what Professor Leti Volpp describes as the use of culture to exoticize harms against 
women. Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1189 
(2001). In her innovative essay, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, Professor Volpp uses a 
vivid example to explain that “burning a woman to death in India is no more exotic than 
shooting a woman to death in the United States,” and yet Americans consider bride burning 
a phenomenon that characterizes the entire culture of the nation of India, while domestic 
violence in the United States “reflect[s] the behavior of a few deviants.” Id. at 1186–89. 
The BIA’s decision in Matter of Kasinga contains a lengthy section entitled “Description 
of FGM” and focuses significant attention on the harms of what they repeatedly label as a 
“tribal” custom, suggesting that in viewing the violence that Ms. Kasinga suffered as 
foreign (and therefore perhaps even somewhat glamorous), the court felt more confident in 
its determination that FGM constituted persecution that merited asylum protection. In re 
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 257, 361–62, 372 (B.I.A. 1996). Similarly, in Matter of S-A-, the 
BIA granted asylum to a girl who suffered domestic violence at the hands of her father, 
who beat her to punish her for what he perceived as her liberal religious beliefs, which 
differed from what the court described as her father’s “fundamentalist Muslim beliefs” 
concerning the proper role of women in Moroccan society. In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
1328, 1330–31 (B.I.A. 2000). Matter of S-A- can be differentiated from Matter of R-A-, as 
it was decided on religion, as opposed to particular social group, grounds and was a case of 
child, not spousal, abuse. See id. However, an examination of both Matter of Kasinga and 
Matter of S-A- “suggests that the decisions to grant asylum in [both cases was] largely due 
to the vilification of non-Western culture rather than an acknowledgement that claims 
involving gender-related persecution indeed fit within asylum jurisprudence.” Anita Sinha, 
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Alvarado’s persecution was not on account of her membership in the proposed 
particular social group of “Guatemalan women who have been involved 
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to 
live under male domination.”85 The court based its reasoning on several 
factors, including its skepticism that “anyone in Guatemala perceives this 
group to exist in any form whatsoever,”86 effectively, a lack of social 
distinction.87 
The BIA’s denial of Matter of R-A- launched a series of remarkable legal 
events. In December of 2000, the Department of Justice (DOJ), largely in 
response to the Board’s decision, issued a proposed rule that provided 
guidance on gender-based asylum claims.88 In 2001, Attorney General Janet 
Reno vacated the BIA’s decision in Matter of R-A- and ordered the case to be 
remanded to the Board for consideration after the proposed rule was 
finalized.89 Exactly four years later, with no movement on the proposed rule, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft recertified Matter of R-A- to himself.90 As a 
result, and in a most striking turn of events, DHS filed a brief in which it 
supported a grant of asylum for Ms. Alvarado.91  
                                                                                                                     
Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum Law: Eliminating the “Cultural Hook” for Claims 
Involving Gender-Related Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1562, 1583 (2001). Thus, it may 
be inferred that the BIA was not as willing to grant asylum when faced with a less exotic 
claim, one based on the more commonplace harm of domestic violence, in Matter of R-A-. 
 85 R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917. 
 86 Id. at 918. 
 87 See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (B.I.A. 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 
I. & N. Dec. 208, 212 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 88 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13). 
 89 OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., ORDER NO. 2379-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001), 
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/AG_Reno_RA_Order_01_19_2001.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/VL7K-KV3P]. 
 90 Matter of R-A-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., https://cgrs.uchastings.edu//o 
ur-work/matter-r [https://perma.cc/EC8U-PSBY]. 
 91 Department of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief 
at 3, In re Alvarado-Pena, No. A 73 753 922 (Att’y Gen. Feb. 19, 2004), 
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter%20of%20R-A-%20DHS%20brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F9DA-2SE9]. DHS’ request was that Ms. Alvarado receive asylum due to 
the “particularly horrendous abuse” she suffered, but the agency was careful to note that it 
was not arguing that all survivors of domestic violence were entitled to asylum. Id. at 2. In 
fact, DHS argued forcefully for a limited holding, noting that “[t]he facts of this case . . . do 
not offer an appropriate vehicle for developing the kind of a comprehensive administrative 
interpretive approach needed for the adjudication of particular social group cases.” Id. at 2–
3. DHS’s position was that the issuance of a final rule would be the most appropriate 
vehicle for a final resolution of claims like those advanced in Matter of R-A- and urged 
“the Attorney General to instruct the Board to grant asylum in this case without issuing an 
opinion . . . so as not to prejudice the rulemaking process.” Id. DHS further requested that 
if the case were decided prior to the issuance of a final rule, that the decision be “narrowly 
tailored and limited as much as possible to the particular facts of this case, to allow 
development of the applicable law through the rule-making process.” Id. at 4. 
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DHS’s reversal of position in Matter of R-A- signaled an increasing 
acceptance of asylum claims based on domestic violence. In its brief, DHS 
articulated a new particular social group into which it felt Ms. Alvarado 
belonged: “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave the 
relationship.”92 The DHS brief marked the first time that this social group 
formulation, one that would become entrenched in domestic violence asylum 
claims in the years to follow, was officially posited. In articulating its basis for 
the group, DHS focused on both the specific characteristics that caused Ms. 
Alvarado’s husband to harm her, as well as the complicity of Guatemalan 
society in his violence.93  
After reviewing DHS’s revised position, Attorney General Ashcroft once 
again remanded the case to the BIA, with orders that it be decided when the 
proposed rule was finalized.94 Three more years passed, and in 2008, a new 
attorney general, Michael Mukasey, ordered the BIA to decide the case 
without waiting for the final rule.95 The Board then remanded the case to the 
immigration judge.96 In December of 2009, after a fourteen year legal battle, 
an immigration judge in San Francisco granted Rodi Alvarado asylum.97  
Of course, because the grant of asylum was issued by an immigration 
judge as opposed to the appellate level BIA, the ruling did not create binding 
precedent. And because the proposed rule drafted in 2000 had not yet been 
finalized, this left a jurisprudential vacuum and the opportunity for the 
emergence of a second significant case in the area of domestic violence 
asylum: Matter of L-R-.  
D. Matter of L-R- 
The tragic circumstances experienced by the applicant in Matter of L-R- 
are strikingly similar to the harms faced by Rodi Alvarado. Born in Mexico, 
Ms. L-R- met the man who would become her tormenter and the father of her 
children when she was nineteen years old.98 He was thirty-three and came 
                                                                                                                     
 92 Id. at 15. 
 93 Id. at 26–27 (“The social group in this case is best defined in light of the evidence 
that Alvarado’s husband believes that women should occupy a subordinate position within 
a marital or intimate relationship, that Alvarado must remain in this subordinate position in 
the relationship, that abuse of women within such a relationship can therefore be tolerated, 
and that social expectations in Guatemala reinforce this view.”). 
 94 In re R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694, 694 (Att’y Gen. 2005). 
 95 In re R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 629 (Att’y Gen. 2008). 
 96 Matter of R-A-, supra note 90. 
 97 In re Alvarado Pena, [redacted] (Exec. Office for Immigration Review Dec. 10, 
2009) (on file with author). The immigration judge’s decision was brief, reading simply, 
“Inasmuch as there is no binding authority on the legal issues raised in this case, I conclude 
that I can conscientiously accept what is essentially the agreement of the parties [to grant 
asylum].” Id. 
 98 Matter of L-R-, supra note 7. 
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from a wealthy and influential family.99 A week after they first encountered 
one another, he dragged her to his home and demanded that she be his 
girlfriend.100 When Ms. L-R- refused, she was beaten and sexually 
assaulted.101 
For the next twenty years, Ms. L-R- was subjected to atrocious 
brutality.102 She was held captive by her abuser, who beat and raped her 
almost daily, often at gunpoint.103 When she became pregnant with her first 
child, she attempted to flee; her abuser found her and tried to burn her alive in 
retaliation.104 The physical, mental, and verbal torment continued, and he 
regularly used threats of violence against Ms. L-R-’s family and their children 
as a means to control her and prevent her escape.105 
Ms. L-R- fled to the United States in 2004 and applied for asylum.106 
When her claim was denied by the immigration judge, she appealed to the 
BIA.107 DHS initially defended the IJ’s ruling, but in a supplemental briefing, 
the DHS reversed its position.108 Citing the “long-unsettled state of U.S. law 
as it applies to [domestic violence] claims,” DHS “depart[ed] from normal 
practice” and used its brief in Matter of L-R- to articulate the agency’s official 
position regarding such claims and propose formulations of particular social 
groups that the Agency believed would be viable for women seeking asylum 
based on domestic violence.109 
DHS first argued that the particular social group posited by Ms. L-R-’s 
attorneys—“Mexican women in an abusive domestic relationship who are 
unable to leave”—was impermissibly circular.110 It then posited two 
alternative groups: “Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable 
to leave” and “Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their 
positions within a domestic relationship” and explained how each met the 
immutability, visibility, and particularity requirements.111 Like in its Matter of 
R-A- brief, DHS stated that it crafted these particular social groups with a view 
                                                                                                                     
 99 Brief of Respondents in Support of Applications for Asylum, Withholding of 
Removal and CAT Relief at 6, In re L-R-, [redacted] (Exec. Office for Immigration Mar. 
10, 2010) [hereinafter Brief of Respondents], https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/ 
L-R-_brief_immigration_court_03_10_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCZ8-ULH9] . 
 100 Id. at 7. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See generally id.  
 103 Id. at 7–10. 
 104 Id. at 10. 
 105 Brief of Respondents, supra note 99, at 10–21. 
 106 Id. at 21–22. 
 107 Matter of L-R-, supra note 7. 
 108 Supplemental briefing was ordered by the BIA “‘in view of’ the Attorney General’s 
recent decision in Matter of R-A-.” DHS 2009 Brief, supra note 9, at 3 (quoting the BIA’s 
December 23, 2008 supplemental briefing notice). 
 109 Id. at 4–5. 
 110 Id. at 10–11 (quoting the immigration court). 
 111 Id. at 14–16. 
2017] DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ASYLUM 751 
towards both the victim and the society in which she lived, stating that because 
“a cognizable particular social group must reflect social perceptions or 
distinctions,”112 it is “best defined in light of the evidence about how the 
respondent’s abuser and her society perceive her role within the domestic 
relationship,” which in this case is that “women should occupy a subordinate 
position.”113 
After the supplemental briefings before the BIA, Matter of L-R- was 
remanded to the immigration judge.114 DHS stipulated that Ms. L-R- was 
eligible for asylum, and on August 4, 2010, she was granted asylum in a 
summary order, once again, a procedural history that left future survivors and 
domestic violence advocates without binding precedent upon which to rely.115 
E. Matter of A-R-C-G- 
After decades of uncertainty and ambiguity during both the pendency and 
after the resolution of Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R-, the BIA issued a 
precedent decision addressing the eligibility of survivors of domestic violence 
for asylum on August 26, 2014. In Matter of A-R-C-G- the Board considered 
the case of a woman from Guatemala, who like Ms. Alvarado and Ms. L-R-, 
was subjected to brutal abuse at the hands of her intimate partner.116 After she 
married at age seventeen, her husband beat her weekly, broke her nose, threw 
paint thinner on her, burned her breast, and raped her regularly.117 When she 
sought help from law enforcement, the police refused to “interfere in a marital 
relationship,” and Ms. A-R-C-G-’s husband threatened her with death if she 
involved them again.118 The BIA found, and DHS conceded, that the abuse 
Ms. A-R-C-G- suffered was on account of her membership in the particular 
social group of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their 
relationship.”119 The fact that DHS did not oppose a grant of asylum on this 
ground,120 and the BIA’s adoption of the particular social group language 
utilized for years after the issuance of the DHS brief in Matter of L-R-, speaks 
volumes about the extent of the “unable to leave” formulation’s penetration 
into the legal culture of domestic violence-based asylum law. 
                                                                                                                     
 112 Id. at 17. 
 113 Id. at 14. 
 114 Matter of L-R-, supra note 7. 
 115 Much like the final order in Matter of R-A-, this decision is also extremely brief. 
The order states that asylum is granted, with a notation that the grant was a result of 
“stipulation of the parties.” Id. (quoting the summary order). 
 116 In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389–90 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 117 Id. at 389. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 388–89. 
 120 DHS instead sought to have the case remanded for “further factual development” 
prior to final resolution of the claim. Id. at 390. 
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It is certainly a laudable advancement that domestic violence claims are 
now officially recognized by the immigration court system, as for many years 
the ability of survivors of spousal or intimate partner abuse to obtain 
protection in the United States was significantly more limited and uncertain. 
However, although the situation has improved, it remains far from ideal. The 
prevailing social group formulations articulated by the DHS in Matter of L-R- 
(“Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” and 
“Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions 
within a domestic relationship”)121 as well as the similar “unable to leave” 
group accepted by the BIA in Matter of A-R-C-G-,122 are deeply problematic. 
As will be discussed in detail in Part IV below, these particular social groups 
further the essentializing narrative of battered women as pitiable and helpless 
victims, and asylum law’s adaption of Lenore Walker’s victim-focused 
framework significantly limits the ability of a survivor of domestic violence to 
articulate or present a counternarrative of empowerment in her case.  
IV. THE PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF ASYLUM LAW’S USE OF PARTICULAR 
SOCIAL GROUPS THAT FURTHER THE HELPLESS BATTERED WOMAN 
NARRATIVE 
A. The Power of Narrative and Danger of Stock Stories 
Narrative, or storytelling, has always been an essential aspect of everyday 
life, but it has increasingly gained attention as critical to lawyering.123 Because 
narrative “is our most basic form of communication and the primary lens 
through which we understand day to day human experience,” it is only natural 
that lawyers seek to use stories in the courtroom or in conducting other forms 
of legal advocacy for their clients.124 But while the utility of narrative is clear, 
it is possible to have too much of a good thing; an overreliance on particular 
                                                                                                                     
 121 DHS 2009 Brief, supra note 9, at 14. 
 122 In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389–90 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 123 See generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971 
(1991) (examining feminist narratives in legal scholarship); Sally Frank, Eve Was Right to 
Eat the “Apple”: The Importance of Narrative in the Art of Lawyering, 8 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 79 (1996) (demonstrating how narrative could be utilized to craft a hypothetical 
defense for the biblical character Eve); Lawyers as Storytellers & Storytellers As Lawyers: 
An Interdisciplinary Symposium Exploring the Use of Storytelling in the Practice of Law, 
18 VT. L. REV. 567 (1994) (examining the role of storytelling more generally in the legal 
profession); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (same); Binny 
Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994) (exploring the intersection between case theory and client 
narrative). 
 124 John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation: What Is a True 
Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 85, 85–86 
(1999) (footnote omitted). 
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narratives can, if overused or utilized without purpose in the absence of critical 
analysis, become static and inescapable stock stories.125  
Like narrative, stock stories, or schema,126 can be useful. Faced with an 
endless stream of stimuli in our daily lives, schema help us assign meaning to 
the information we receive, limit unnecessary processing, and allow us to draw 
inferences about what might happen in the future.127 However, as Professor 
Gerald López writes, while “stock stories embody our deepest human, social 
and political values” and “help us carry out the routine activities of life 
without constantly having to analyze or question what we are doing[,] . . . they 
also may disguise and distort.”128 When stock stories become the sole lens 
though which a client or experience is viewed, and/or when they serve to 
perpetuate stereotypes or limit open-mindedness or free-thinking, they are 
highly problematic.129 And when narrative evolves to a unitary stock story—a 
legal category or conception that one must adhere to in order to receive 
protection—it becomes a dangerous legal weapon. This is precisely what has 
occurred in domestic violence asylum law. 
                                                                                                                     
 125 Nicole E. Negowetti, Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias: A Cognitive Science 
Primer for Civil Litigators, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 278, 301 
(2014) (explaining that stock stories create implicit biases that affect the way stories are 
told in the courtroom).  
 126 Stock stories and schema are generally defined as “stories [that] help us interpret 
the everyday world with limited information and help us make choices about asserting our 
own needs and responding to other people.” Gerald P. López, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 3 (1984). For more on stock stories and schema, see generally ANTHONY G. 
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW: HOW COURTS RELY ON 
STORYTELLING, AND HOW THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE WAYS WE UNDERSTAND THE 
LAW—AND OURSELVES 121 (2000); STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: 
CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 176–80 (2009); and Albert J. Moore, 
Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273 (1989). 
 127 Stefan Krieger and Richard Neumann provide a short but illustrative example of the 
function of schema in the everyday world:  
When we go to a restaurant . . . and a person comes to our table with a pad and pencil, 
we do not expect that the person is going to ask for an autograph or take dictation, but 
without giving the situation a second thought, we anticipate that the person will take 
our order. 
STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS: 
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 145 (5th ed. 
2015). 
 128 López, supra note 126, at 3. 
 129 Author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie explains the danger of stock stories and 
stereotypes like this: “The single story creates stereotypes, and the problem with 
stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete. They make one story 
become the only story.” Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, The Danger of a Single Story, TED 
(Oct. 2009), https://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_stor 
y/transcript?language=en [https://perma.cc/GK9D-AHPM]. 
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B. The Consequences of Failure to Conform to the Prevailing Victim 
Narrative 
As a result of the proliferation of the Battered Woman Syndrome narrative 
and the ensuing stock story—the myth of the helpless abused woman—
survivors of domestic violence who fail to conform to this paradigmatic 
powerless and docile victim role are at risk of not obtaining the legal 
protections they desperately need.130 As Professor Leigh Goodmark describes, 
women—particularly women of color and lesbians—who do not fit neatly into 
the prevailing narrative are often denied orders of protection when they fight 
back against their attackers or refuse to admit fear.131 Similarly, Professor 
Laurie Kohn explains that a nonpassive victim of domestic violence who 
expresses anger towards her assailant may be deemed incredible and denied a 
protection order.132 Finally, Professor Evan Stark shares a case study in which 
a survivor of violence was “tearful and frightened outside the court, [but] in 
the courtroom she appeared defiant,” leading the court to view her as “an 
aggressive, demanding, even ‘rude’ mother.”133 These injustices in the civil 
context—victims being required to conform their narratives to a particular 
stock story in order to be safe—endure in the realm of asylum law.134 
While preconceived notions regarding the way victims of domestic 
violence should behave may lead to injustice in a civil proceeding because 
decision-makers are not hearing the narrative they expect, they seem certain to 
doom the claim of an asylum applicant who is not always passive or 
submissive to her abuser because the notion of the “helpless victim” is written 
into asylum law. As discussed above, the prevailing particular social group 
formulations in domestic violence-based asylum cases require a woman to 
prove that she has been “unable to leave” her abuser or that he views her as his 
property.135 This necessitates an applicant telling a particular type of story to 
the asylum adjudicator, namely, that she is docile and powerless. She must 
show that she could never muster the strength or internal fortitude to stand up 
to her abuser and leave, that she was viewed as, and likely even felt like, 
chattel.  
                                                                                                                     
 130 See Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)Course: Moving 
from White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061, 1085 (2006) 
(“[O]ne must be a victim — a particular kind of victim — in order to get help. An inability 
to show one’s victim status may result in a failure to obtain the assistance one needs.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 131 Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She 
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75 (2008) (explaining how women who fight back 
are often not viewed as victims). 
 132 Laurie S. Kohn, Barriers to Reliable Credibility Assessments: Domestic Violence 
Victim-Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 733, 739 (2003). 
 133 Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to 
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 1012–13 (1995). 
 134 See Goodmark, supra note 131, at 82. 
 135 See In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A. 2014). 
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Although some survivors of domestic violence may in fact fit this profile, 
many others do not.136 Ana, the fictional client profiled in the Introduction to 
this Article, serves as an example of such a woman. Her story does not 
comport neatly with the narrative of helplessness, as Ana not only fought back 
against her abusive husband through retaliatory or protective physical violence 
of her own, but she actively instigated his attacks in an effort to shield herself 
and her child from further harm. Moreover, Ana does not fit the stock story or 
expected narrative of the domestic violence victim finally pushed to the brink 
and furtively escaping in the dead of night. Instead, Ana made a difficult and 
rational choice to leave after her abuser permitted her to do so; her situation 
can therefore be more appropriately expressed as being unable to return as 
opposed to unable to leave. Thus, unless Ana and her lawyers ignore the 
aspects of her story that highlight her clear thinking and opposition to being 
viewed as a piece of property that her abuser can dispense with as he pleases, 
she may not be considered eligible for asylum protection.137  
But even if a woman is able to obtain asylum, the harm of the existing 
particular social groups is not necessarily avoided. Asylum law exists to 
provide protection to refugees—individuals who have faced unspeakable 
horrors in their home countries and fear further harm if they are returned. 
Thus, the need to tell a tragic story may be demanded in any asylum claim, 
regardless of the basis for protection. However, if, for example, a political 
activist is seeking asylum for speaking out against abuses committed by her 
                                                                                                                     
 136 See Dutton, supra note 38, at 1196. 
 137 It should be noted that women who refuse to submit to their abusers may be able to 
make an asylum claim based on their political opinion. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
906, 913 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (Att’y Gen. 2001), remanded, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 694 (Att’y Gen. 2005), stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (Att’y Gen. 2008); Matter 
of L-R-, supra note 7. In fact, both Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- argued that they were 
persecuted not only based on their membership in a particular social group but also their 
assertion of a feminist political opinion that includes defiance of male domination. R-A-, 
221 I. & N. Dec. at 915–18; Matter of L-R-, supra note 7. However, the results in Matter of 
R-A- and Matter of L-R- demonstrate clearly why a domestic violence survivor’s cannot 
reliably utilize political opinion as a basis of protection, as the political opinion claims 
were rejected in both cases. R-A-, 221 I. & N. Dec. at 915–18; Matter of L-R-, supra note 
7. In making its determination, the BIA in Matter of R-A- and DHS in Matter of L-R- cited 
the high evidentiary bar established in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992), which requires an applicant to provide evidence that 
her political opinion motivated the persecutor to harm her. R-A-, 221 I. & N. Dec. at 912–
13, 916 (“What we find lacking in this respondent’s showing, however, is any meaningful 
evidence that her husband’s behavior was influenced at all by his perception of the 
respondent’s opinion.”); see also DHS 2009 Brief, supra note 9, at 22 (“[T]here is no 
record evidence to reflect that, even if [redacted] was aware of the female respondent’s 
feminist views and opposition to dominance, his abuse was related to her opinions on this 
matter.”). This difficulty in establishing a viable political opinion claim in domestic 
violence asylum cases, along with the stated position of DHS preferring social group 
claims in such cases, leaves particular social group as the most viable option for survivors 
of domestic violence.  
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home country’s government, she is permitted under existing law to tell a story 
of both victimization and empowerment. In her asylum application and 
testimony, she may speak of how she fought against oppression and was jailed, 
tortured, or (like a domestic violence victim) beaten and raped as a result. The 
current particular social group formulations in domestic violence claims do not 
allow survivors of domestic abuse to tell the first half of this story—the 
aspects of their narrative that show them fighting against subjugation. Strength 
or dignity must be eradicated from their narrative. There is only one way to 
prevail, and that is to be completely powerless. 
The effective inability of a survivor of domestic violence to tell her 
authentic story, one that may involve a combination of power and 
powerlessness, is a profound violation perpetrated by the legal system. As 
Professor Ann Shalleck describes, “[i]n order to secure what legal protections 
exist, [survivors] often must violate their own understanding of themselves 
and conform to the dominant stereotype,” forcing them to lose themselves in 
the process.138 Similarly, the pressure to conform to the “ideal” meek and 
impotent victim narrative denies an abused woman the opportunity to 
(re)claim her identity as a “free person[] entitled to a liberatory response.”139 
In effect, the legal requirements of the asylum system serve to control and 
potentially coopt a survivor’s sense of self, ironically, an action previously 
undertaken by her abusive partner.  
The experiences survivors of domestic violence have with the justice 
system already possess a significant element of essentialization, making “one 
characteristic of a woman’s experience define her entire identity, thereby 
marginalizing or trivializing other aspects of her identity. . . . Her strengths 
and her accomplishments become submerged under the label of ‘battered 
woman.’”140 This may be particularly true in the case of immigration law, a 
                                                                                                                     
 138 Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between 
Lawyer and Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 
1026 (1997). 
 139 STARK, supra note 43, at 16. Stark notes that although he does not necessarily agree 
with “conservative feminists” who claim that the severity of male violence is exaggerated, 
writers such as Camille Paglia and Kate Rophie are right to challenge rhetoric that focuses 
exclusively on victimization. Id. at 9. He further argues that this singular view of women as 
victims, as well as the recognition of only physical violence and not the more nuanced 
effects of male domination as constituting domestic violence, allows for the maintenance of 
the prevailing social hierarchy of men over women. Id. 
 140 Shalleck, supra note 138, at 1023; see also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of 
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 25 (1991). 
Professor Mahoney describes a woman interviewed at a domestic violence shelter who 
explained that “[i]t’s difficult to accept yourself as a ‘battered wife’ as the term isn’t right. I 
have had a lot of marital troubles, which have included violence. Despite all my attempts to 
make the marriage work, I had no choice but to get away.” Id. (quoting Joy Melville, Some 
Violent Families, in VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 9, 10 (J.P. Martin ed., 1978)). Mahoney 
emphasizes that “[s]he defines herself as active, working to solve her problems, reaching 
out for solutions. These actions conflict with her sense of what a ‘battered wife’ is.” Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
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realm in which the means by which lawful status is gained becomes a key part 
of one’s identity formation as an American citizen or resident of the United 
States.141 Here, a domestic violence survivor who is ultimately able to secure 
asylum protection forms her immigrant identity based on powerlessness.  
Thus, as demonstrated above, because stories are how we define ourselves, 
how we create and shape our identities, counternarratives of strength and 
empowerment are critically important, especially to those who have survived 
intimate partner violence. Returning to the concept of stock stories, Professor 
Richard Delgado succinctly explains how such unitary narratives can become 
problematic: 
Narrative habits, patterns of seeing, shape what we see and that to which we 
aspire. These patterns of perception become habitual, tempting us to believe 
that the way things are is inevitable . . . . Alternative visions of reality are not 
explored, or, if they are, rejected as extreme or implausible.142 
Conversely, counterstories “challenge the received wisdom,” “showing us that 
there are possibilities for life other than the ones we live.”143 As Professor 
Delgado eloquently states: 
Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for 
destroying mindset — the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and 
shared understandings against a background of which legal and political 
discourse takes place. These matters are rarely focused on. They are like 
eyeglasses we have worn a long time. They are nearly invisible; we use them 
to scan and interpret the world and only rarely examine them for 
themselves.144  
In the area of domestic violence, where power and control are widely 
understood to be the primary tools of abuse,145 the fact that a woman cannot 
push back against the stock story by telling a counterstory that allows her to 
assume and proclaim her identity as a powerful agent is particularly 
lamentable. As experts have noted, a battered woman is further disempowered 
when, “rather than having faith in the validity of her story, she is counseled to 
                                                                                                                     
 141 See, e.g., Guy Raz, What Does Identity Mean for an Immigrant?, NPR (Oct. 11, 
2013), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=229881828 [https:// 
perma.cc/F762-DTPQ]. 
 142 Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2416–17 (1989) (footnote omitted). 
 143 Id. at 2414. 
 144 Id. at 2413 (footnote omitted). 
 145 “Power and control” is generally understood as the “interrelated dimensions of 
physical abuse, economic abuse, coercion and threats, intimidation, emotional abuse (using 
isolation, minimizing, denying, and blaming), and abusing male privilege.” ELIZABETH M. 
SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 12 (2000). 
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retell the incident to make it more suitable for the [legal system].”146 Thus, 
“[n]arratives that enable a woman to see that she is not responsible for the 
violence against her, and that she is actively struggling against that violence, 
can be an essential tool in helping her hold on to her sense of self.”147 This is 
why feminist scholars focus on women’s agency, in the hope that doing so can 
“provide a more realistic, dignified account of women’s resistance to male 
domination, without minimizing the harm done by oppression.”148  
It is precisely this type of counternarrative that is foreclosed by the 
“unable to leave” and “viewed as property” particular social groups—a grave 
harm to immigrant survivors. In order to receive what may be life-saving 
asylum status, women must sacrifice their sense of strength and power, and 
perhaps even their identities. This requirement speaks volumes about our legal 
system and its view and treatment of women. Moreover, it sends a chilling 
message to survivors of domestic violence who are newcomers to the United 
States as well as to the rest of the world, one that will be addressed in 
Part IV.D below, that only certain types of women—those that are meek, 
docile, and powerless—are welcome in this country.  
C. Lawyering and Feminist Critiques 
1. Challenges for Client-Centered and Ethical Advocacy 
As described in Part IV.B above, the inability of a survivor of domestic 
violence to convey a narrative or present an identity of empowerment is highly 
problematic from a psychological perspective. But it is damaging from a legal 
perspective as well, because permitting only a unitary and essentialized image 
of a battered woman in asylum law creates challenges for client-centered 
representation.  
The goal of client-centered representation, the method of advocacy most 
frequently taught in law school clinical programs, is to move away from a 
paternalistic model of lawyering towards one which increases clients’ control 
of and power in the attorney–client relationship.149 The lawyer’s role is to 
provide information and counsel, while the client is given primary 
responsibility over decision-making in her case, largely based on the 
understanding that the client is best equipped to understand her life and needs 
and make determinations about the best course of action for herself and her 
                                                                                                                     
 146 M. Joan McDermott & James Garofalo, When Advocacy for Domestic Violence 
Victims Backfires: Types and Sources of Victim Disempowerment, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 1245, 1250 (2004). 
 147 Goodmark, supra note 131, at 79.  
 148 MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 97 (2d ed. 
2003). 
 149 Katherine R. Kruse, Engaged Client-Centered Representation and the Moral 
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 577, 585–86 (2010).  
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family.150 The theory also teaches that every attempt should be made to 
understand and present both legal and factual scenarios from the client’s point 
of view.151  
Asylum law’s restrictive and reductive narrative of a domestic violence 
survivor as a weak and helpless victim may prevent a lawyer from engaging in 
client-centered representation. In the client-centered lawyering model, an 
attorney is expected to lay out all the legal options to her client, including both 
potential risks and benefits of different approaches, and allow the client to 
decide on a course of action.152 Knowing that she must present a particular 
story and certain type of client to the adjudicator in order to prevail, a lawyer 
may understandably be tempted to convince a client to omit or minimize any 
stories in which the client is not presented as meek or docile, despite wishes of 
the client to the contrary. More problematically, a lawyer may not even present 
the option of telling the counterstory to her client, as it would preemptively be 
deemed a nonviable legal strategy.  
Even if a lawyer does not knowingly minimize the role of her client, 
unconscious cognitive bias may affect the information sought and ultimately 
presented. For example, confirmation bias, which is the tendency to seek out 
or listen only to evidence consistent with one’s views or preconceptions—and 
thereby ignore or dismiss evidence that contradicts those views—might cause 
a lawyer to focus only on aspects of a client’s narrative that conform to the 
prevailing battered woman narrative.153 Thus, in adhering to stock stories, 
                                                                                                                     
 150 Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered 
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 390 (2006). 
 151 This one-paragraph description is of course sorely inadequate, as much has been 
written about the theory of client-centered representation in a variety of legal areas. See, 
e.g., DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT–CENTERED APPROACH 
(3d ed. 2012) (examining many aspects of lawyering, including counseling, information-
gathering, and decision-making, from a client-centered perspective); Robert D. Dinerstein, 
Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990) 
(assessing various models of client-centered counseling); Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis 
of Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the 
Negotiation Context, 34 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1987) (discussing client-centered 
representation in the negotiation context); Dina Francesca Haynes, Client-Centered Human 
Rights Advocacy, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 379 (2006) (addressing client-centered 
representation in the field of human rights); Kruse, supra note 149 (addressing the 
interplay between client-centered representation and ethics); Kruse, supra note 150, 370–
71 (identifying client-centered representation as “one of the most influential doctrines in 
legal education today”); James E. Moliterno, A Golden Age of Civic Involvement: The 
Client Centered Disadvantage for Lawyers Acting as Public Officials, 50 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1261 (2009) (discussing the relevance of client-centered representation for lawmakers 
and public officials); Laurie Shanks, Whose Story Is It Anyway?—Guiding Students to 
Client-Centered Interviewing Through Storytelling, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 509 (2008) 
(explaining the challenges of persuasively telling a client’s story). 
 152 See Kruse, supra note 150, at 369. 
 153 See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous 
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998). 
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advocates may consciously or unconsciously limit their client’s voice, as in the 
process of “pick[ing] and choos[ing] from among the available facts to present 
a picture of what happened,” certain facts are chosen for emphasis, the whole 
story may never be told, and ultimately, the whole person may be lost.154  
This concern is particularly pronounced in the area where domestic 
violence and asylum intersect. With respect to legal advocacy for women who 
have experienced domestic violence, as explained above, a lawyer’s 
imposition of a particular narrative against her client’s will may serve to 
replicate and perpetuate the imposition of power and control a survivor 
experienced in her abusive relationship. And in the context of asylum law, 
where the nature and history of the “largely male-oriented body of law” has 
conditioned lawyers to formulate women’s cases “in ways which reflect the 
advocate’s understanding of the law rather than the reality of the applicant’s 
experiences,” the inability of a female client to tell her true story impacts not 
only the survivor herself but the status of women in the immigration legal 
system as a whole.155 Strict adherence to the Matter of L-R- and Matter of A-
R-C-G- particular social group formulations may therefore damage the 
relationship between a lawyer and her client, inhibit open and honest 
communication, and may ultimately even adversely impact the outcome of a 
legal case (or the integrity of the legal system as a whole)—all things that 
client-centered advocacy seeks to prevent.  
Moreover, in the most extreme cases, an attorney’s unwavering 
commitment to utilizing the groups articulated in Matter of L-R- and Matter of 
A-R-C-G- may lead to ethical lapses. Rule 1.2 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct states that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client 
as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”156 Similarly, Rule 1.4 
requires a lawyer to: “reasonably consult with the client about the means by 
which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished; . . . [and] explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation.”157 In attempting to strictly adhere to 
the Matter of L-R- and Matter of A-R-C-G- formulations, an attorney may be 
tempted not to consult with her client about the narrative advanced in the case, 
may not fully explain all potential legal avenues and options to her client, or 
may disregard a client’s wishes about the story she seeks to tell. Any of these 
actions, resulting from the limitations imposed by the existing particular social 
groups, may not only be ill-advised as not client-centered, but may also 
constitute a violation of an attorney’s ethical obligations.  
                                                                                                                     
 154 Delgado, supra note 142, at 2421. 
 155 Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of 
Women, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 625, 629 (1993). 
 156 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
 157 Id. r. 1.4 (a)–(b). 
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2. Victim Blaming 
The term “victim-blaming” was coined by Dr. William Ryan, who 
described the phenomenon in the context of racial discrimination, explaining 
that whites justified inequality and social injustice against blacks by finding 
defects in their African-American victims.158 The practice of blaming a victim 
for harms that befall her is also widespread in the area of violence against 
women.159 In the domestic violence context, the question of “why didn’t she 
just leave?” is frequently used to shift focus from the abuser’s behavior and 
fault onto the victim for not taking steps to avoid his violence.160 Debilitating 
to the women who have suffered abuse, victim-blaming is also a means for 
allowing violent behavior to continue.161 As Walker argues, “[b]y perpetuating 
the belief that it is rational to blame the victim for her abuse, we ultimately 
excuse men for the crime.”162 
Victim-blaming is perpetuated by the L-R- and A-R-C-G- particular social 
group formulation because a natural question when hearing that a battered 
woman is unable to leave a relationship is, “Why not?” Perhaps the victim did 
not try hard enough. Or perhaps the abuse wasn’t so bad after all or she would 
                                                                                                                     
 158 See generally WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM (1971) (discussing the 
phenomenon of victim-blaming). 
 159 See generally Francis X. Shen, How We Still Fail Rape Victims: Reflecting on 
Responsibility and Legal Reform, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2011) (discussing victim-
blaming in the context of sexual assault); Jerry von Talge, Victimization Dynamics: The 
Psycho-Social and Legal Implications of Family Violence Directed Toward Women and 
the Impact on Child Witnesses, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 111, 131 (2000) (noting that a 
“second dimension of the multiple victimization of women is societal blame”). 
 160 See generally OLA W. BARNETT & ALYCE D. LAVIOLETTE, IT COULD HAPPEN TO 
ANYONE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN STAY (1993) (discussing the cognitive and social 
reasons why battered women stay with their abusers); WHY DOESN’T SHE JUST LEAVE? 
(Heather Stark & Emilee Watturs eds., 2008) (explaining recent research and real women’s 
stories to explore why women remain with their abusers); Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles 
to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay, COLO. LAW., Oct. 1999, at 19 (delineating fifty 
reasons why abuse victims stay with their abusers). This phenomenon was highlighted 
recently after the public release of a video of professional football player Ray Rice 
physically abusing his wife led him to be suspended indefinitely from the NFL. Rheana 
Murray, After Ray Rice Video, Women Explain #WhyIStayed, ABC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/ray-rice-video-women-sound-off-whyistayed/story?id=25374313 
[https://perma.cc/8ECB-56TK]. When his wife came to his defense, many questioned her 
decision to remain with him, prompting the proliferation of the Twitter hashtag 
#WhyIStayed through which women explained the complex reasons that survivors of 
domestic violence chose to remain with abusive partners. Id. 
 161 See ROYAL COMM’N INTO FAMILY VIOLENCE, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
16 (Mar. 2016), http://files.rcfv.com.au/Reports/RCFV_Full_Report_Interactive.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X492-5SVB] (“Community attitudes that misconstrue or condone family 
violence have powerful impacts: they compound the shame that victims feel and dissuade 
them from making disclosures and seeking assistance, and they give licence [sic] to 
perpetrators to continue their abuse.”). 
 162 WALKER, supra note 26, at 15. 
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have tried harder to escape it. Even if onus of action in “unable to leave” is 
placed on the abuser, i.e., that he did not allow her to leave as opposed to her 
being unable to leave, questions about the existence of personal failings in the 
victim that prevented her from taking the necessary steps to protect herself 
remain.  
In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA noted that “a married woman’s inability to 
leave the relationship may be informed by societal expectations about gender 
and subordination, as well as legal constraints regarding divorce and 
separation.”163 In Ana’s case, a multitude of factors prevented her from 
leaving her abusive husband: absence of economic resources, feelings of 
isolation and lack of support from her family members, and his threats to bar 
her from seeing their daughter if she left. His connections to law enforcement 
were also a significant barrier to her ability to break free and are likely also 
evidence of the government’s unwillingness to protect her from harm. 
However, given the complexity and nuance involved in these issues, it remains 
to be seen what effect the dicta in Matter of A-R-C-G- will have and whether 
or not courts will actually consider such factors when making determinations 
about survivors’ decisions and actions.  
3. Separation Violence 
Framing the problem of domestic violence around a woman’s inability to 
leave also raises concerns related to the theory of separation violence, or 
separation assault. Conceived by Professor Martha Mahoney, the term 
describes the escalation of violence and incidence of higher rates of physical 
assault towards women following attempts to break free from violent 
relationships or otherwise assert their independence from their abusers.164 If, 
as is widely understood, domestic violence is ultimately about an abuser’s 
need to exert power and control, the notion of separation violence is quite 
logical, as a woman’s efforts to leave threaten the batterer’s exercise of that 
power and control. Empirical research thus establishes that a woman is at 
greatest risk of injury or death when she leaves or attempts to leave an abusive 
relationship because heightened violence is a means for a batterer to regain or 
reassert control after his partner’s demonstration of agency.165 
                                                                                                                     
 163 In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 164 Mahoney, supra note 140, at 64. 
 165 See generally Barbara J. Hart, The Legal Road to Freedom, in BATTERING AND 
FAMILY THERAPY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 13 (Marsali Hansen & Michèle Harway eds., 
1993) (citing a variety of studies on separation violence); Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, 
Spousal Homicide Risk and Estrangement, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 3, 8 (1993) (“[W]ives 
are much more likely to be slain by their husbands when separated from them than when 
co-residing.”). A report recently released by the Dallas Domestic Violence Taskforce and 
the Institute for Urban Policy Research at the University of Texas at Dallas highlights the 
significance of separation violence in just one community. See generally DENISE PAQUETTE 
BOOTS & TIMOTHY BRAY, DALL. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TASKFORCE & INST. FOR URBAN 
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The “unable to leave” formulation effectively penalizes a battered woman 
who attempts to break free from domestic violence. If she was able to leave 
(either temporarily or permanently in her escape to the United States) it may 
reasonably be argued that these efforts to flee render her ineligible for 
membership in the stated particular social group. Although the “unable to 
leave” particular social group formulation is typically understood as having a 
silent parenthetical of (“until now”) attached to the end,166 it is not always safe 
to rely upon this legal fiction. An immigration judge in an unpublished case 
highlighted this point, and demonstrated the inconsistency and confusion 
surrounding the “unable to leave” group, when denying the asylum claim of a 
battered woman because “the applicant’s status in the relationship was not 
immutable because she ‘did eventually leave [her abuser]’ to flee to the United 
States, which ‘terminat[ed] the relationship.’”167  
An act of separation that may jeopardize a battered woman’s legal status is 
also precisely what may exacerbate her risk of serious harm. As experts have 
noted: 
By leaving the relationship, the battered woman is engaging in the ultimate 
challenge to her abuser’s power, authority, and control. . . . [T]he abuser now 
knows that she is capable of leaving him, and he escalates his abuse in order 
to punish her for her challenge to his authority and to ensure that such a 
challenge does not happen again.168  
Thus, ironically, acting in a manner that runs counter to the “unable to 
leave” narrative is what puts a woman at the greatest risk of harm—thus 
meriting asylum protection the most—but this behavior may be the thing that 
causes her to be denied protection at this critical time.  
                                                                                                                     
POLICY RESEARCH AT THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT DALL., ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT: 2014-
2015 (2015), http://www.neighborhoodindicators.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dallas 
%20Domestic%20Violence%20Taskforce%20Report%20-%20Final%20-%20Copy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GVB4-UM68]. Of the thirty-four intimate partner violence fatalities that 
occurred between 2009 and 2011 in Dallas, “[f]ive . . . victims were killed immediately 
after threatening to break up with the perpetrator just before the homicide, 4 victims has 
[sic] just ended their relationship with the offender immediately prior to the homicide, and 
6 of the relationships ended some time prior to the homicide event.” Id. at 26. In total, 44% 
of the homicides in Dallas during the three-year period were attributable to separation 
violence. Id. 
 166 This is the only logical way to interpret the particular social group definition 
because if a woman had truly been unable to leave the relationship, she would not be in the 
United States seeking asylum. 
 167 Bookey, supra note 6, at 140 (alterations in original) (quoting the immigration 
judge). 
 168 Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation 
Violence as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 
342 (2009). 
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D. The “Worthiness” Problem 
A study described in Evan Stark’s seminal book, Coercive Control, starkly 
reveals the dangers of constructing and relying on essentialized portraits of 
battered women.169 The study examined the admission logs of a California 
domestic violence shelter and found that women who were deemed “worthy” 
of entry into the shelter typically fit the stereotypical image of the pitiable, 
passive, and “morally pure” victim.170 Meanwhile, women who were not 
visibly injured, or who demonstrated strength, agency, or resilience in the face 
of abuse, were turned away.171 As one log entry noted about an “unsuitable” 
service-seeker (in a depiction that could easily have been used to describe 
Ana): “she is an extremely young woman with ‘ruff attitude’—if he hits me I 
always hit him back.”172 Women who appeared too agitated or confused, 
seemed unlikable or strange, or did not otherwise fit the stereotypical victim 
profile, were considered inappropriate for admission.173 Meanwhile, those who 
were considered “a very classical case and nice” readily received shelter and 
protection.174  
These images and narratives of “undesirability and unworthiness” 
contrasted with those of “worthiness and blamelessness” also pervade 
immigration law,175 making this issue particularly salient in an area that 
examines the intersection of gender-based violence and asylum. In the law, in 
the media, and in public perception, there exist images of archetypal “good” 
immigrants who deserve their place in American society, and conversely, 
“bad” immigrants who should be denied admission or expelled from the 
United States176 And while survivors of domestic violence are likely to land in 
                                                                                                                     
 169 See STARK, supra note 43, at 77. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. (quoting the shelter log). 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. (quoting the shelter log). 
 175 See, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration 
Reform and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101, 104 (2013). See generally, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, 
Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. 
Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207 (2012) (examining the polarizing narratives 
of “good” and “bad” immigrants); Harold Hongju Koh, Who Are the Archetypal “Good” 
Aliens?, 88 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 450 (1994) (discussing causes and consequences of 
labeling “good” and “bad” immigrants). 
 176 See, e.g., Alexia Fernández Campbell, The Problem with Only Letting in the ‘Good’ 
Immigrants, ATLANTIC (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/ 
10/immigration-winners-and-losers/503435/ [https://perma.cc/Q3V3-F6GS]; The Daily 
Show with John Stewart: The Two Faces of Illegal Immigration (Comedy Central 
television broadcast Oct. 10, 2013), http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/u60haq/the-two-
faces-of-illegal-immigration [https://perma.cc/YQ4U-J9AL] (video clip profiling the city 
manager of Dayton, Ohio who views the influx of immigrants as a positive thing for the 
economy as well as a documentary film maker and conservative commentator, who notes 
that, while there are some immigrants here to better their lives, most are dangerous and 
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the former category, this may only be because the concept “of the ‘good 
female alien’ [is] rooted in notions of passivity and helplessness.”177  
Professor Stacy Brustin explains that many of the existing immigration 
protections for battered women—enshrined in the INA of 1990 and the 
VAWA—exist because the “policy and public debate center[ed] around an 
image of immigrant women as deserving of legalization because they are 
frightened, helpless victims.”178 The Matter of L-R- and Matter of A-R-C-G- 
particular social group formulations further entrench this image of the 
powerless victim and thereby serve to perpetuate the dichotomy of good and 
bad immigrant. Matter of L-R- and Matter of A-R-C-G- teach that a “good” 
battered woman asylum seeker is a piece of property who lacks the agency to 
leave her pitiable situation. She, unlike a woman who resists and fights back 
against the violence she faces, is deemed worthy of admission to, and 
protection in, the United States.  
V. PROPOSED FIXES 
Although reliance on particular social group formulations that perpetuate 
the victimization of battered women is deeply problematic for the many 
reasons articulated above, fortunately, several alternatives to the currently 
utilized frameworks exist.  
A. Issuance of a Final Rule Governing Domestic Violence Asylum 
Claims 
As explained in Part III, on December 7, 2000, after the BIA’s initial 
denial in Matter of R-A-, the DOJ issued a proposed rule whose stated aim was 
to “aid in the assessment of claims made by applicants who have suffered or 
fear domestic violence.”179 In an effort to bring clarity to domestic violence-
                                                                                                                     
detrimental to our communities); ISD Editorial Board, Editorial, Child Immigrants Deserve 
U.S. Protection, IOWA ST. DAILY (July 30, 2014), http://www.iowastatedaily.com/opinion/e 
ditorials/article_5ff62ae8-142e-11e4-b59d-0019bb2963f4.html [https://perma.cc/M5KK-
6DZM] (asserting that, while they may have entered the country unlawfully, 
unaccompanied immigrant children crossing the border, many fleeing violence and 
poverty, should be allowed to stay in the United States); Dave Seminara, Legalizing Illegal 
Immigrants a Bad Idea, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 8, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-
02-08/opinion/ct-perspec-0208-immigration-20130208_1_illegal-immigrants-legal-status-
guest-worker [https://perma.cc/MY9T-8GJN] (explaining that, while he supports the 
DREAM Act, which would give permanent residency to certain immigrants who arrived in 
the Untied States as minors, the author opposes a pathway to citizenship for all unlawfully 
present immigrants because it would “vindicate those who broke the law,” increase identity 
fraud, and would not cause those dangerous people living in the shadows to come forward). 
 177 Brustin, supra note 14, at 455. 
 178 Id. at 456. 
 179 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13). 
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based asylum claims, the proposed rule first reiterates and confirms that 
“gender can form the basis of a particular social group” and that survivors of 
domestic violence are entitled to asylum in the United States.180 The proposed 
rule also deliberately “does not specify how a claim of persecution based on 
domestic violence should be fashioned—in particular, it does not set forth 
what the precise characteristics of the particular social group might be” 
because the DOJ recognized that crafting a particular social group is a fact-
specific endeavor and groups will likely “vary depending upon the social 
context” of the applicant’s country.181 It instead lays out “generally applicable 
principles” and factors to consider when adjudicating domestic violence 
asylum claims.182  
Decision-making in Matter of R-A- was stalled for years in anticipation of 
finalization of this rule,183 and today, many administrations and seventeen 
years later, it remains in proposed form. The lengthy delay and absence of 
final regulations have been a significant cause of the confusion and uncertainty 
in domestic violence asylum law. The lack of direction from the DOJ likely 
also contributed to courts’ reluctance to render published precedent decisions 
on the subject. And while Matter of A-R-C-G- has created some certainty, 
unlike the proposed rule, it limits viable claims to only those that fit a narrow 
category articulated in its accepted particular social group. 
Finalizing the proposed rule at long last would not only bring additional 
certainty to this area of the law, but also provide guidance to both advocates 
and decision-makers, who would then have the freedom to proceed with their 
own analyses within the general framework of the DOJ policy. And because 
the proposed regulations refrain from proposing particular social groups, all of 
the participants in the system would be free to deviate from the existing Matter 
of L-R- and Matter of A-R-C-G- frameworks that further the narrative of the 
helpless, meek, and submissive victim in favor of case-specific and fact-
specific groups that recognize a variety of responses to domestic violence. 
B. Advancing Alternative, Non-Essentializing, Particular Social Groups 
Although issuance of final regulations by the DOJ would undoubtedly be a 
significant milestone, there is currently no indication of when the rule might 
be finalized, and the existing delay certainly has not led to much optimism 
about its imminent release.184 And because the Department declined to 
propose specific social groups for domestic violence cases, it is not certain that 
                                                                                                                     
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. at 76589. 
 182 Id. 
 183 See Matter of R-A-, supra note 90. 
 184 See Bookey, supra note 6, at 148 (“The U.S. government has stated that regulations 
are ‘being worked on’ by DHS and DOJ. If the last twelve years are any indication, little 
confidence can be placed in such pronouncements.” (footnote omitted) (quoting The 
Regulatory Plan, 74 Fed. Reg. 64137, 64221 (Dec. 7, 2009))). 
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issuance of final regulations would solve the problems raised by this Article. 
Even if the rule is finalized, attorneys and judges may continue to rely on the 
Matter of L-R- and Matter of A-R-C-G- frameworks due to inertia or simply 
because a better alternative is not readily apparent. Therefore, what follows 
below are examples of potential particular social groups that could be used in 
lieu of the existing Matter of L-R- and Matter of A-R-C-G- formulations. 
These proposed groups are not intended to be an exhaustive list, as the goal of 
this Article is not to create additional pigeonholes or limitations; they are 
simply suggestions that advocates may draw upon as examples of alternative 
groups. All of the proposed groups depart from the existing narrative of the 
helpless, docile, and submissive battered woman and instead advance a group 
definition that allows for survivors of domestic violence to demonstrate 
strength, self-reliance, and empowerment.  
1. Women as a Particular Social Group 
The simplest articulation of a particular social group would be “women” 
from the applicant’s home country, or perhaps the applicant’s village, city, 
town, or geographic region. Such an approach is supported by the United 
Nations,185 the scholarly community,186 and existing federal case law.187 
However, recognizing that while viable, “women” as a particular social group 
may not readily be accepted by decision-makers, the group could be narrowed 
                                                                                                                     
 185 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-
Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 
2002) (“It follows that sex can properly be within the ambit of the social group category, 
with women being a clear example of a social subset defined by innate and immutable 
characteristics, and who are frequently treated differently than men. Their characteristics 
also identify them as a group in society, subjecting them to different treatment and 
standards in some countries.” (footnote omitted)). 
 186 See generally Bethany Lobo, Women as a Particular Social Group: A Comparative 
Assessment of Gender Asylum Claims in the United States and United Kingdom, 26 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 361 (2012) (comparing the approach of the United States with that of the 
United Kingdom and noting that the U.K. House of Lords has recognized asylum claims 
based on the particular social group of “women” in their home state); David L. Neal, 
Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum, 20 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203 (1988) (demonstrating domestic and international legal 
support for a particular social group of “women”). 
 187 See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Thus, we clearly 
acknowledged that women in a particular country, regardless of ethnicity or clan 
membership, could form a particular social group.”); Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 
518 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding “Somali females” to be a cognizable particular social group); 
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although we have not 
previously expressly recognized females as a social group, the recognition that girls or 
women of a particular clan or nationality (or even in some circumstances females in 
general) may constitute a social group is simply a logical application of our law.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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by the inclusion of one of many limiting characteristics. Descriptors and 
limitations based on age, relationship status, opposition to abuse, or family, 
clan, or tribal membership could serve to further delineate membership. 
2. Women Who Resist Domestic Violence but Are Unable to Leave Their 
Relationship 
A second potential re-conception of the “unable to leave” particular social 
group is not to do away with it altogether, but to simply modify it to better 
reflect the reality of many women’s responses to domestic abuse. A particular 
social group of “women who resist domestic violence but are unable to leave 
the relationship” would allow for applicants to articulate and reclaim an aspect 
of their stories and present a counternarrative that is not premised on 
helplessness and passivity to violence.  
Such a social group would surely be viable, as the “unable to leave” 
portion has already been deemed to be in compliance with existing standards 
and requirements for particular social groups.188 The additional characteristics 
“women” and “resist[ing] domestic violence” both also survive scrutiny. Being 
a woman is inarguably an immutable characteristic and women are both 
recognized as a discrete class of persons and seen as a distinct group in all 
societies. Similarly, resisting violence is immutable as it is surely so 
fundamental to a woman’s identity or conscience—not to mention safety and 
bodily integrity—that she should not be required to change her behavior. 
Women who fight back against domestic abuse are also a sufficiently 
particular group, although advocates may be able to further refine what form 
the resistance took and potentially alter the group definition accordingly. 
Lastly, if abused spouses who are unable to leave survive a social distinction 
analysis, it is logical that those who resist but are subsequently unable to leave 
would also be sufficiently socially distinct.  
3. Women Who Assert Independence from Abusive Partners or Women 
Who Challenge Male Domination 
Another possible particular social group that could be utilized by survivors 
of domestic violence seeking asylum in the United States is “women who 
assert independence from abusive partners” or “women who challenge male 
domination.” While not overtly relying on a feminist or anti-violence political 
opinion, these groups implicate that alternative ground of protection under 
asylum law. And like the group above, these formulations present a strong 
image of a battered woman who is affirmatively acting to resist abuse.  
Because these groups rely heavily on the more clear-cut political opinion 
ground of asylum protection, and because the component of resistance makes 
them comparable to the particular social group long-accepted as precedent in 
                                                                                                                     
 188 See Bookey, supra note 6, at 135 n.114. 
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Matter of Kasinga,189 they too are viable under the existing particular social 
group definition and requirements. As discussed above, gender is immutable, 
and the challenge to, or assertion of, independence from abuse is certainly 
fundamental to one’s identity and conscience. The terms used in the group are 
specific, although again, fact-finding and investigation could certainly make 
them more specific on a case-by-case basis, and such defiance of family 
violence will often be unique enough in a particular culture that those who 
undertake such brave acts are understood to constitute a discrete group.  
4. Women Who are Married to (or in Relationships with) Abusive Men 
Framing a particular social group not around victims of violence but 
around the perpetrators themselves is yet another possibility. A group of 
“women who are married to (or in relationships with) abusive men” puts the 
onus precisely where it should be—on the batterers and violent men 
themselves. Although DHS claimed that the particular social group “abused 
women” was circular in its 2009 brief,190 this group is distinguishable, as it 
focuses not solely on the abuse suffered, but on the effect both the relationship 
and the abusive character of the partner have on the likelihood of persecution. 
And as with the groups above, a particular social group defined by gender and 
familial relationship arguably satisfies the requirements of immutability, 
visibility, and particularity. 
5. Women Who Have Fled an Abusive Relationship 
Finally, another potential particular social group is “women who have fled 
an abusive relationship.” This articulation is appealing because it recognizes 
the significant role that separation violence plays in abusive relationships; as 
discussed in Part IV.C.3, the time after a woman leaves her batterer is 
statistically the most lethal and therefore arguably most meriting of the safe 
harbor of asylum protection. This group also departs from a view of women as 
impotent and incapable non-actors, as the focus is on a woman’s active 
response of departing and protecting herself from violence.  
However, this group is also not without its challenges. One major 
drawback relates to nexus, as a woman can only face future harm on account 
of her membership in this group. Because the group cannot encompass past 
persecution, an applicant would have to focus solely on the harm that would 
befall her in the future and therefore forfeit her ability to benefit from the 
presumption of future persecution that attaches when past persecution is 
                                                                                                                     
 189 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996) (“[T]he applicant is a 
member of a social group consisting of young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe [of 
northern Togo] who have not had [female genital mutilation], as practiced by that tribe, and 
who oppose the practice.” (emphasis added)). 
 190 DHS 2009 Brief, supra note 9, at 10–11. 
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established.191 But if the facts of a specific case do not make this a liability, for 
example, if a claim for past persecution is weak or difficult to prove, a group 
focused on a woman’s escape from violence would otherwise qualify as a 
valid particular social group under existing asylum law. The act of fleeing is 
immutable and the terms in the group—gender, abuse, and flight—are readily 
definable, thereby making the group delineable. The absence of these spouses 
from their homes and communities would also make them distinct as a group.  
Of course, it is not sufficient for these five alternative particular social 
groups, or any others that creative lawyers posit, to exist in theory or solely in 
the pages of law journals. In order to create public and judicial awareness and 
acceptance of Professor Delgado’s “counterstories”—those that empower, 
“challenge the received wisdom” and “show[] us that there are possibilities for 
life other than the ones we live”—advocates must actually advance these 
claims in their cases.192  
As indicated above, in its proposed regulations, the DOJ declined to 
articulate a particular social group for domestic violence claims, noting that 
group definitions are fact-specific and “likely will vary depending upon the 
social context in [the] country.”193 The agency stated that it was “ill-advised to 
try to establish a universal model for persecution claims based on domestic 
violence” and that a “case-by-case adjudication” was more appropriate for 
such claims.194 However, in reality, advocates often do not deviate from the 
accepted particular social groups in domestic violence claims, relying largely 
on—and perhaps even attempting to shoehorn their clients into—the Matter of 
L-R- and now codified Matter of A-R-C-G- formulations. This is of course 
understandable, as attorneys are generally a risk-averse group and the 
potentially life-threatening consequences of losing an asylum claim make it a 
particularly unsuitable area for impact litigation. However, the fact remains 
that alternative particular social groups are available and viable, and unless 
advocates begin advancing such claims, the law will never progress beyond 
the current essentializing groups. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The law has made great strides in protecting women who seek refuge in 
the United States from domestic violence, but there is still a long way to go 
before such cases are considered coequal to more traditional asylum claims. 
Historically, asylum law in the United States has been a mechanism to support 
and protect those who fight against injustice and bravely rise up against the 
                                                                                                                     
 191 An applicant who has been found to have established past persecution shall also be 
presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution (or that his or her life or freedom 
would be threatened) on the basis of the original claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)(1) (2016). 
 192 Delgado, supra note 142, at 2414. 
 193 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76589 (proposed Dec. 7, 
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13). 
 194 Id. 
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greater power of the state.195 But as Professor Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo 
eloquently states, “[d]omestic violence, particularly in countries that are 
unable or unwilling to protect victims, is the manifestation of a state belief in 
male dominance.”196 Viewed through this lens, battered women are not so 
different from the revolutionaries, freedom fighters, and political activists who 
came before them. They are abused by, but also often rise up against, men who 
have had the benefit of years of systematic privileges: the reinforcement of 
male privilege in law, culture, and society; the lack of sufficient infrastructures 
to adequately address domestic abuse; the reluctance of judicial actors to 
believe the stories of victims of family violence; and many more. 
The first step in recognizing battered women as the fighters and survivors 
they unquestionably are is to reframe the asylum narrative for those seeking 
protection in the United States from domestic violence. Advancing particular 
social groups that move away from depictions of women as helpless, 
dependent, and impotent victims and instead accepting stories of power and 
agency will be a significant step in bringing much needed gender equity into 
asylum law.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 195 See Matthew E. Price, Politics or Humanitarianism? Recovering the Political Roots 
of Asylum, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 282 (2004) (explaining that the origins of asylum law 
have largely centered around protected citizens rising up against their regimes). 
 196 Cianciarulo & David, supra note 168, at 369 (citing In re R-A-, 221 I. & N. Dec. 
906, 939 (B.I.A. 1999) (Member Guendelsberger, dissenting)). 

